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Abstract: Gender inequality in access to resources remains persistent in 
rural areas in developing countries. To better understand the mechanisms 
responsible for gender inequality, we start from the observation that 
access to resources in rural villages is largely determined by within-village 
resource sharing, which is embedded in social networks. It is therefore 
important to study the influence of gender on resource sharing while 
taking into account the social networks of men and women. To do so, we 
combine data from a distribution experiment and a network survey in rural 
Nicaragua. We find that sharing is higher among friends and that women 
have fewer friends than men. Men share more than women and do not 
discriminate against women, while women share less with men. These 
results are robust to controls for friendship ties and gender differences 
in the reporting of these ties. We attribute these results to the gendered 
division of labor.
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1 Introduction
Gender inequality in access to resources and opportunities remains persistent in many do-
mains. Lowering gender inequality is assumed to be both intrinsically valuable and instru-
mental in bringing about productivity gains and improved social development outcomes, 
including for children. This is even more the case in rural areas in developing countries 
where gender inequality and poverty tend to be more severe and intertwined. It is argued 
that tackling gender inequality in these areas has an enormous potential to reduce poverty 
in many ways (World Bank 2012). For example, increasing women’s access to resources such 
as credit, fertilizer, and improved seeds would raise agricultural yields on female-controlled 
plots by 20–30% (Food and Agriculture Organization 2011). There is also growing evidence 
that resources in mothers’ hands are more beneficial for children’s health and nutrition than 
when the same resources are managed by the children’s fathers (Hoddinott and Haddad 
1995; Thomas 1990, 1993). Increasing women’s access to resources would then tackle inter-
generational poverty.
To design policies that are more effective at tackling gender inequality in rural areas 
in developing countries, we need to improve our understanding of the mechanisms that 
are responsible for the persistence of gender inequality in access to resources. We start 
from the observation that access to resources in these areas largely depends on resource 
sharing among fellow villagers, which is strongly embedded in social networks (Ligon and 
Schechter 2012). This implies that to identify the mechanisms that are responsible for the 
persistence of gender inequality in such settings, a better understanding is needed of how 
resources are shared among men and women, and how this interacts with the social net-
works of men and women.
To study these questions we surveyed almost all households in a rural village in Nicara-
gua and elicited the network of friendship ties of both spouses in each household. After the 
survey, we conducted a series of incentivized resource-sharing experiments, using so-called 
“dictator games.” In these games “dictators” could share financial resources with randomly 
selected other villagers as well as nonanonymous strangers outside the village, called “recip-
ients.” Combining survey and experimental data, we explore how the gender of the dictator 
and the recipient influence sharing decisions. In a next step, we test whether gender effects 
on resource sharing work directly or indirectly through the influence of gender on the for-
mation of friendship ties by comparing regressions with and without controls for social ties. 
Finally, we exploit an important feature of our data, namely that we have the perspective 
from both persons in a pair of villagers on their social relation. This allows us to identify 
whether there are any gender differences in the reporting of friendship ties, and whether it 
matters for the estimation of the effect of friendship ties on sharing across pairs of different 
gender combinations.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that sharing is higher among 
friends and that women have fewer friendship ties within their village than men. Second, 
we find that men share more than women and share similarly with men and women, while 
women share less with men than with women. Third, these gender differences in sharing are 
robust to controls for friendship ties as well as potential gender differences in the reporting 
of these ties. We attribute the observed gender differences in friendship ties and resource 
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64 Journal of Development Perspectives
sharing to the gendered division of labor, with women spending a larger part of their time 
on caring for the offspring and the management of household chores, tasks which require 
little mobility.
Several studies are related to ours. First, over the last two decades, there has been a bur-
geoning literature that uses experimental methods to study gender differences in resource 
sharing. Many of them used university subjects, and showed a large variety in outcomes, 
although contrary to our findings, none of them found women to be less generous than 
men.1 A growing number of studies have taken the lab to the field in developing countries, 
and many of them included gender controls in their analysis. The ones that used dictator 
games, as we do, did not find statistically significant gender effects (e.g., Ado and Kurosaki 
(2014) in Jakarta; Binzel and Fehr (2013) in Cairo; Gowdy et al. (2003) in Nigeria; Jakiela 
(2011) in Kenya; and Ligon and Schechter (2012) in Paraguay;).2 Second, another line of 
experimental research has developed around how sharing is influenced by social proximi-
ty (Bohnet and Frey 1999; Charness and Gneezy 2008). Some of these studies have looked 
at the role of real-life social ties for resource sharing. Leider et al. (2009) found a positive 
effect of social proximity in social networks on resource sharing among students at a U.S. 
university, a result replicated by Goeree et al. (2010) with teenage girls at a high school and 
Branãs-Garza et al. (2010) with undergraduate economics students in Spain, and recently 
extended to developing countries by Ligon and Schechter (2012) with villagers in rural 
Paraguay.3
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our research design, 
including the social tie elicitation procedure and the procedures followed in the dictator 
game experiment. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses and Section 4 discusses the 
results and concludes.
2 Research Design
In this section, we describe the main elements of our research design, which consists of a 
survey to elicit social ties, a standard survey that captures socioeconomic characteristics, 
and a controlled resource-sharing experiment. We also present some theoretical consider-
ations that we will use to structure the analyses.
1. Whereas some studies did not find any gender effect, others found that women tend to be more 
generous than men (see, e.g., Bolton and Katok 1995; Cox and Deck 2006; Croson and Gneezy 
2009; Eckel and Grossman 1996, 1998; and Konow et al. 2008 for a survey). Evidence on the effect 
of the recipient’s gender on the giver’s decision is also mixed. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) 
found that men receive less than women and Ben-Ner et al. (2004) found that if the gender of the 
recipient is known, women tend to give systematically less to women than to men and persons of 
unknown gender.
2. Dictator games have been widely used to elicit sharing preferences (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, chap-
ter 2). In our experiment neither the term dictator or dictator game was used.
3. Some studies have looked at gender and social pressure exerted by spouses or relatives to share 
income (Ashraf 2009; Jakiela and Ozier 2016). However, with decision making being private in our 
experimental setup, we do not expect social pressure to have any significant influence on sharing.
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2.1 Data Collection
Of each household in a rural village, one randomly selected spouse was invited to partici-
pate in a resource-sharing experiment. More specifically, each participant played six sub-
sequent so-called “dictator games” with different recipients. The experimenter explained to 
each participant who was in the role of a dictator that (s)he would sequentially receive six 
small cylinder boxes, each containing 20 coins of one Córdoba, c$ (the Nicaraguan curren-
cy), which (s)he could (but need not) share with one other named person. For each dictator, 
the first recipient was a stranger—that is, an unknown but named person from another 
village in the region. That the stranger was named allowed dictators to know the gender of 
the recipient. The five subsequent recipients were randomly selected village members.
The random selection involved the dictator drawing cards out of a bag containing all 123 
participants. Only after the dictator had finished the sharing decision regarding a recipient 
was the name of the subsequent recipient drawn. Dictators were informed of the procedures 
before they made any decision and, hence, knew that their maximum possible earnings would 
be c$120 (USD6.70 at the time of the experiment). These potential earnings corresponded to 
more than two days’ average income in rural Nicaragua. After explaining the instructions, 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions and if we identified that (part of) the 
instructions were unclear, we provided additional explanations. This procedure made sure 
that all participants understood the instructions before making any decisions.4
We planned to conduct the experiment with all households in the village and had to 
make sure that the chance of contagion was minimized. Therefore, only one spouse per 
household was allowed to participate as a dictator, and in households with two spouses it 
was randomly determined which of the two was asked to participate. We did not exclude 
participation of the other spouse in the role of recipient, but ensured that spouses of the 
same household were not matched as a dictator–recipient pair.
Each dictator was made aware that, although (s)he knew the identity of the recipient, the 
recipient did not know and also would not be told by us who had given the money. When 
delivering the money to recipients, we neither revealed the identity of the dictator(s) who 
sent the money, nor informed them about how many dictators had participated. Also dic-
tators did not know how many other dictators would participate.5  Dictators and recipients 
also did not learn anything about others’ earnings. All this was known by the dictators when 
they made their decisions.
This one-way anonymity design provides some advantages over both a complete anon-
ymous design, where receivers and dictators do not know each other’s identity, and a full 
disclosure design, where receivers and dictators do know each other’s identity.6 First, in 
contrast to complete anonymity, one-way anonymity enables dictators to take into account 
4. We also considered paying out only one randomly chosen decision, but decided against it because 
the explanation and implementation of a randomization device would have been very time-con-
suming and may have also raised suspicion in our subjects who did not have any experience with 
economics experiments.
5. This made it very unlikely that dictators anticipated that the recipients they were matched with 
would receive money from other dictators.
6. For a similar design, see the one-way identification treatment of Bohnet and Frey (1999).
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66 Journal of Development Perspectives
real-life socioeconomic characteristics of the recipient, including gender, friendship ties, 
and other important factors that may influence resource sharing.7 Second, with a full dis-
closure design, more motives could influence sharing, such as anticipated reciprocity and 
sanctions, which could complicate the interpretation of the results. With our one-way an-
onymity design, in contrast, resource sharing should be mainly influenced (directed) by 
altruism, which has been shown to be one of the most important drivers of sharing in 
friendship relations (Leider et al. 2009).8
We organized the experiment in a decentralized way, by having Nicaraguan research as-
sistants visiting individual participants at their homes to conduct the experiment. In doing 
so, we deliberately deviated from the often used protocol in lab-in-the-field experiments, 
where experiments are centrally conducted at a public spot. We did so for the following 
two reasons. First, we wanted to minimize selection bias. Organizing the experiment at a 
public spot would open the door for self-selection as some people are reluctant to partici-
pate in public events, which might be correlated with their generosity, gender, and number 
of friendship ties. Second, during such gatherings, mutual influence among participants is 
hard to control, and we anticipated that people’s behavior would be influenced by the iden-
tity of the other participants at such an event, including their gender.9
To minimize experimenter effects due to the assistant’s presence, we employed the fol-
lowing three precautionary measures. First, all decisions were made in full privacy. As a 
rule, participants went inside their house or to a separate room and were thus out of sight 
of the assistant when making a decision. If this was not possible, the assistant turned his 
or her back when the dictator was handling the coins. The dictators were also instructed 
not to make any comments about their decisions. Second, after having taken from the box 
the coins they wanted to keep, dictators had to fill the box with metal rings. This ensured 
that the weight of the box remained constant irrespective of the amount of coins taken out. 
Third, after each decision, the box was sealed with tape. The decisions were recorded by 
the assistants’ supervisor (one of the authors) who did not have any interaction with the 
participants. The dictators were made aware of these procedural details before they made 
any decisions.10
An important aspect in controlled experiments is that participants trust the researchers. 
This is not necessarily guaranteed when participants have no experience with economic ex-
periments. Therefore, to build trust, we first conducted the household and social tie survey. 
This ensured that the research assistants were already known to the local people when they 
visited them for the experiment. Another important element was the support of the well-re-
spected local community leaders, who at the start of the field research presented our team 
to each household and asked people to cooperate with the research team. By conducting the 
 7. We could have opted for a full anonymity design in which only the gender of the recipient is 
revealed. However, the application of such a design in settings characterized by extreme gender 
inequality would likely have suffered from an experimenter demand effect. For example, it is likely 
that with such a design, male participants might think that we would appreciate it if they showed 
generosity toward women who suffer from gender inequality.
 8. We cannot exclude that dictators reveal themselves to the recipients after the experiment. We will 
discuss the consequences of this in the discussion section.
 9. For more on such social effects in lab-in-the-field experiments, see Castillo and Carter (2003).
10. For more details on the experimental instructions, refer to Appendix A.
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whole experiment in only one day, we minimized possible contagion effects. We adminis-
tered debriefing questions, which showed that 94.5% of the participants did not talk about 
the experiment with other village members who had already participated; hence, contagion 
is virtually absent. In addition, the research assistants were asked to make a subjective eval-
uation about the participants’ dedication, trust, and understanding of the experiment. We 
did not notice any problems that could have affected the dictators’ decisions.
The experiment was organized immediately after the surveys that captured basic socio-
economic data as well as social ties with each of the spouses of the other households from 
the same village. For the latter, we adapted a survey method successfully employed by eco-
nomic anthropologists and sociologists for mapping bounded networks.11,12 Specifically, to 
elicit the social ties of an interviewee, we used a stack of small cards representing all house-
holds in the village. Each card held the name(s) of the spouse(s) of a household. For each of 
the cards, the interviewee was first asked whether (s)he knew the household. If they knew 
the household, s(he) was asked whether (s)he had a “social relation of any kind” with (one 
of) the spouse(s). If the answer was affirmative, we asked the interviewee to specify which 
spouse (s)he had a relation with, as well as the content of that relation. The use of cards gave 
us an easy way to avoid any order bias in the elicitation of the ties, by reshuffling the cards 
at the start of every new interview.13
2.2 Theoretical Considerations
To structure the analysis, we use the following model. Following Andreoni and Miller 
(2002), we use a utility function Ui(x, E−x; αij), which depends on the payoffs of subjects 
i and j. We assume that the payoffs are directly determined by the distribution decision of 
player i and that this decision remains unknown to j. Specifically, subject i decides to keep x 
out of an endowment E for herself and to give the remainder E − x to person j, to maximize 
their utility. The parameter αij ∈ [0, 1] weighs the importance of the amount given to the re-
cipient versus the amount kept x. The larger its value, the more will be given to the matched 
recipient. It can be seen as a measure of i’s altruism and consists of two components with 
α α αij i i ijP= +0 1   (cf., Leider et al. 2007). The first component represents i’s baseline altruism 
and the second measures i’s directed altruism, with Pij being the social proximity between i 
and j. It captures the idea that people tend to attribute a higher weight to the income of close 
others (Bohnet and Frey 1999; Charness and Gneezy 2008). In our setting, we assume that 
Pij = 1 if i and j are friends, 0 otherwise, with αi0 ≥ 0 and αi1 ≥ 0.
11. Bounded networks are networks with clearly defined boundaries, such as networks within villages 
and organizations, for which all members are surveyed. For a description of the method see, for 
instance, the documents section of Jean Ensminger’s and Joseph Henrich’s Roots of Sociality proj-
ect website at http://jee.caltech.edu/files/2011/06/Social-Network-Analysis.pdf.
12. Leider et al. (2009) used an incentivized coordination game procedure to elicit friendship ties 
among Harvard students. We did not adopt their elicitation method as it would be too complicated 
for our subjects.
13. In addition to friendship relations we also captured economic relations, neighbor relations, family 
relations, and joint participation in social–public activities. As there is convincing evidence that 
resource sharing is mostly driven by proximity in friendship ties (Branãs-Garza et al.  2010; Goeree 
et al. 2010; Leider et al. 2009),  we focus on friendship ties in this article.
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Importantly, we expect gender differences in αi0, αi1, and Pij. First, there may be a gen-
der difference in baseline altruism (αi0). In line with some of the experimental literature 
discussed above, baseline altruism may be larger for women than for men. However, the 
development economics literature suggests that women may get more utility out of keep-
ing x than men, which would make baseline altruism actually lower for women than for 
men, implying an opposite hypothesis. It has been documented that women have a stronger 
preference to spend resources on human capital, such as health, food-related household 
consumption, and their children (Dunbar et al. 2013; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Kenne-
dy and Peters 1992; Phipps and Burton 1998; Thomas 1990, 1993; Yoong et al. 2012;). Such 
preference may make women share less than men with people outside their household.
Second, we can also expect the directed altruism component αi1Pij to differ between men 
and women. This may be due to expected differences in Pij if women, compared to men, are 
on average more socially distant from other people in their village, which in turn would make 
women share less with other people in their village. Women may be less socially connected 
with others in their village, as they tend to face more severe constraints in terms of time 
poverty (Blackden and Wodon 2006) and spatial mobility (Hanson 2010; Mandel 2006), both 
the result of the existing gendered division of labor. There may also be considerable levels of 
sorting on gender in social ties as identified by some empirical studies (Attanasio et al. 2012; 
Bastani 2007; Comola and Fafchamps 2014; Marsden 1987; Stehl et al. 2013; Wellman 2007). 
In addition, αi1 may differ across different gender combinations. The higher mobility and 
time constraints that women face may make it more difficult for them to take advantage of 
any social ties, which might lower their importance to them. Also, same-gender ties may be 
more valued than mixed-gender ties, as individuals who are similar are more likely to interact 
with each other (for a literature review on “homophily” effects, see McPherson et al. 2001).
3 Results
In this section, we present the empirical results. After a description of the study location, we 
present the analyses, which look at potential gender effects as described in the conceptual 
section. We will start with a descriptive analysis of the sharing decisions, after which we em-
ploy regression analysis to look into the influence of gender and friendship ties on resource 
sharing. We end with some robustness tests that take account of potential gender biases in 
the reporting of friendship ties.
3.1 Location
For this study, we selected a village located in a rural area in the Northern part of the Pa-
cific region of Nicaragua. It was purposely selected as it is representative for this area. The 
difficult agro-ecological conditions (dry season, irregular rainfall, low fertility of soils, etc.) 
make agricultural activities not very profitable in this region. Cattle breeding is one of the 
most lucrative economic activities because it is both an income source and an important 
savings instrument that enables local people to bridge the long and harsh dry season.
The village consists of 66 households of which 9 have only one spouse (i.e., divorced 
or widow/widower) and 57 have two spouses. This size is similar to other villages in the 
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area. Of the 123 spouses in total, 61 are male and 62 are female. We collected data on 58 
households (87.9%) and at least 100 spouses (81.3%). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of 
important socioeconomic characteristics. It indicates a pronounced diversity across house-
holds as well as spouses.
In panel (a) we observe that 34.48% of the households own land and land possession is 
unequally distributed, with the standard deviation being more than twice as large as the 
mean of 11.74 hectares. For cattle possession, the figures are similar: 46.55% of all house-
holds possess cattle, and the average number of cows per household is 3.55 with a standard 
deviation of 9.44. We also calculated a wealth index equal to the first factor of a maximum 
likelihood factor analysis using economic assets such as land, cattle, and the possession of 
tools/equipment which are good proxies for wealth in the region.
Panel (b) summarizes individual characteristics of spouses. Average education of spouses 
in the village, measured in number of years of schooling, is only slightly above 4 years with 
quite some variation. Another potentially important characteristic is the number of years of 
residence in the village, the average of which is around 33 years. The average frequency of 
contact with the urban center, which is important to obtain access to economic goods and 
services, is around 2 visits, as measured in the most recent month before our survey.
Average differences between men and women are as follows. Men are on average 5.71 
years older than women (p = 0.041, two-sided t-test). This is in line with average age differ-
ences between husbands and wives in rural Nicaragua. Other differences are not statistically 
significant: education (average difference = -0.74; p = 0.290, two-sided t-test), residence 
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Important Socioeconomic Characteristics
Mean/Percentage St. Dev. No. of Obs.
a. Households
Land (percentage of owners) 34.48 −  58
Land (mean in ha.) 11.74 24.76  58
Cattle (percentage of owners) 46.55 −  58
Cattle (mean in no. of animals) 3.55 9.44  58
Wealth (index) 0.00 1.75  58
b. Spouses
Gender (percentage male) 49.50 − 109
Age (mean in years) 46.05 14.49 109
Education (mean in years) 4.13 3.59 109
Residence in village (mean in years) 33.22 15.63 100
Visits to urban center (mean no. last month) 2.07 3.36 100
c. Dictators
Gender (percentage male) 47.37 −  57
Age (mean in years) 44.16 12.78  57
Wealth (index) −0.07 1.65  57
Education (mean in years) 3.72 3.30  57
Residence in village (mean in years) 32.91 15.40  57
Visits to urban center (mean no. last month) 2.10 2.61  57
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in village (average difference = 4.76, p = 0.131, two-sided t-test) and visits to urban center 
(average difference = 1.06, p = 0.117, two-sided t-test).
Panel (c) presents the characteristics of the spouses who participated in the dictator 
game. We observe that the characteristics are very similar between panels (b) and (c), which 
confirms that the random selection of the sampled respondents into the experiment was 
done successfully.
3.2 Descriptive Analysis of Sharing
We start with a descriptive analysis of sharing decisions, and how they depend on the gen-
der of the dictator and recipient. Then, we look at the role of social proximity, by studying 
whether it influences sharing, whether it correlates with gender, and whether its effect on 
sharing depends on gender.
3.2.1 Sharing and Gender
Figure 1 presents the distribution of coins given to the recipient (including strangers and fel-
low villagers), disaggregated by the gender of the dictator. For both male and female dictators 
we observe large variation in allocations with a dominant mode at the equal split of 10 coins. 
These distributions indicate that women tend to share less resources than men. On average, 
women leave 8.78 coins (st. dev. 4.68) and men leave 10.36 coins (st. dev. 4.65) to the recipient.
Intriguingly, there is a relatively large share of decisions in which dictators leave more 
than 50% of the coins to the recipient. Two factors may account for this generous behavior. 
First, before making a decision, dictators were given the name of the recipient.14 Second, 
14. Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Charness and Gneezy (2008) showed that revealing the identity of the 
recipient significantly increases dictator giving. Henrich et al. (2005) also observed proposals of 
more than 50% in ultimatum game experiments in some of their investigated small-scale societies.
Figure 1 Resource sharing by gender of dictator.
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as in most small-scale societies, in this village most people know each other (based on our 
social ties data, in 93.5% of all possible ties the other was known).
In a next step, we take the gender of the recipient into account. Figure 2 shows the cumu-
lative distributions of resource sharing of male and female dictators for same-gender pairs 
(panel (a)) and different-gender pairs (panel (b)). These distributions again indicate that 
women tend to share less than men do, and that the differences become stronger when the 
dictator and recipient have different genders, as a comparison of both panels shows.
Figure 2 Resource sharing by gender of dictator and recipient.
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72 Journal of Development Perspectives
To test whether average sharing differs between male and female dictators, and whether 
it depends on the gender of the recipient, we use a two-tailed Wald-test. Table 2 presents 
the results. Using all dictator–recipient pairs (panel (a)), we find that male dictators tend to 
share more than female dictators, in both same-gender and different-gender pairs. Based 
on the p-values, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference in sharing. Using 
pairs of dictators and recipients who live in the same village, we find that the difference in 
sharing between men and women is statistically significant with different-gender pairs.
3.2.2 The Role of Social Proximity
The fact that we only find significant gender differences in sharing with pairs in the same 
village suggests that the effect of gender interacts with social proximity between dictator 
and recipient. Social proximity differs depending on whether dictator and recipient live 
in the same village, and if they live in the same village, whether they have a friendship tie. 
While the first source of variation is exogenously determined by our experimental design, 
variation in friendship ties is endogenous, and may be correlated with gender.
As discussed before, there are two important ways in which social proximity can interact 
with gender. First, if social proximity influences sharing—as several studies have demon-
strated—and at the same time correlates with gender, gender differences in sharing may be 
caused by gender differences in social proximity. For example, women may be less generous 
than men if they have fewer social ties with other people in their village than men. Second, 
the influence of social proximity on sharing itself may depend on the gender of the dictator 
and recipient. To get an idea of whether our data support these mechanisms, we will look at 
each of these conditions. More specifically, we will have a closer look at whether: (1) social 
proximity influences sharing; (2) social proximity correlates with gender; and (3) the effect 
of social proximity on sharing depends on gender.
In a first step, we study whether social proximity, via social ties and living in the same 
village, influences sharing. Overall, we gathered social ties data for 100 of the 123 spouses 
(81.3%).15 As explained before, we asked each spouse whether (s)he had a friendship tie with 
the other spouse.
15. Our success rate is slightly higher than those of Goeree et al. (2010) and Leider et al. (2009), who 
report success rates of 77% and 71%, respectively. Of the missing 23 spouses, only two refused to 
participate and 21 were not present in the village when we conducted the study.
Table 2 Sharing by Gender Combination
Women Men
Mean N Mean N p-value
a. All pairs
Same gender 9.09 96 10.39 84 0.204
Different gender 8.42 84 10.33 78 0.117
b. Same village pairs
Same gender 9.19 80 10.55 67 0.190
Different gender 8.16 70 10.63 68  0.042**
Notes: Wald-test with standard errors corrected for multiple decisions per dictator, by using a robust (lineariza-
tion) variance estimator. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 3 shows how the distribution of coins left to the recipient varies across different 
levels of social proximity. We observe that the distribution of coins left to friends is skewed 
toward higher generosity compared to the distributions of coins left to nonfriends who live 
in the same village and to strangers.
In a second step, we test whether social proximity via social ties correlates with gender. 
Table 3 reports the frequency of friendship ties. Panel (a) presents these frequencies as a pro-
portion of the total number of potential ties. Reported friendship ties among men are more 
common than among women (22.82% and 7.50%, respectively), and based on two-tailed 
adjusted Wald-test, the difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000).16 Friend-
ship ties among men are also more common than mixed-gender ties as reported by men 
(6.47%), which is again statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000). The frequency of 
friendship ties among women is similar to the frequency of mixed-gender ties as reported 
by women (two-sided p = 0.188).
In a final step, we test whether the influence of social proximity depends on the gender of 
the dictator. Table 4 presents the results. In panel (a) we compare average sharing between 
recipients from a different village (strangers) and recipients from the same village who are 
nonfriends. Differences are not statistically significant. This is also the case when we disag-
gregate by the gender of the dictator. Comparing average sharing between recipients who 
are friends and nonfriends from the same village (panel (b)) we only find a difference for 
male dictators, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Male dictators share on aver-
age 12.95 coins with friends and 10.15 with nonfriends. Finally, comparing average sharing 
16. Standard errors in this test is corrected for multiple responses per ego, by using a robust (linear-
ization) variance estimator.
Figure 3 Sharing by social proximity.
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74 Journal of Development Perspectives
between friends and strangers, (panel (c)), we again find a significant difference with male 
dictators (which is now statistically significant at the 1% level), but not with female dictators.
3.3 Regression Analysis
So far, we observed that gender differences in sharing are more pronounced among fellow 
villagers than among strangers. At the same time, we found substantial variation in social 
proximity (via friendship ties) among fellow villagers, which is correlated with gender and 
sharing. Because of these correlations, it is important to investigate to what extent the gen-
der differences in sharing are mediated through gender differences in friendship ties and 
to what extent they represent a direct gender effect. To do so, we run a regression with the 
sharing decisions with fellow villagers, in which we control for the gender of the dictator 
and recipient, as well as whether they are friends. Using a regression framework also allows 
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Reported Friendship Ties
(a) All dyads (b) Alter reports tie
Freq. N Freq. N
Men–men 22.82% 2,629 28.38% 444
Men–women  6.47% 2,672 11.39% 237
Women–women  7.50% 3,386 17.54% 228
Women–men  9.69% 3,323 17.09% 158
Table 4 Sharing by Social Proximity
Stranger Nonfriend
Panel a Mean N Mean N p-value
All 9.18 57  9.34 250 0.755
Men 9.22 27 10.12 113 0.186
Women 9.13 30  8.70 137 0.596
Nonfriend Friend
Panel b Mean N Mean N p-value
All  9.34 250 11.43 32 0.152
Men 10.12 113 12.95 21  0.034**
Women  8.70 137  8.27 11 0.860
Stranger Friend
Panel c Mean N Mean N p-value
All 9.18 57 11.34 32 0.115
Men 9.22 27 12.95 21    0.006***
Women 9.13 30  8.27 11 0.724
Notes: Wald-test with standard errors corrected for multiple decisions per dictator, by using a robust (lineariza-
tion) variance estimator. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Nonsymme-
trized friendship ties used.
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us to control for other confounding socioeconomic factors. More specifically, we use the 
following specification:
 Yij = α + βXij + eij, (1)
where Yij denotes the amount of coins dictator i gave to village recipient j, Xij denotes the 
vector of explanatory variables which we will discuss in detail below, and eij is an error term. 
As each dictator performed sharing decisions regarding five different village recipients, the 
observations cannot be assumed to be independent. In particular, we have that E [eij, eik] ≠ 
0 for all k. Further, different dictators may have been asked to make a distribution decision 
with the same recipient, implying that E [eij, ekj] ≠ 0 for all k. To correct standard errors for 
these dependencies, we apply clustering on both dimensions separately (for a formal dis-
cussion of this issue, see e.g., Cameron et al. 2011; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007).17
To estimate the determinants of dictators’ inclination to share resources with particular 
village members, we use the following identification strategy. To study the effect of different 
gender combinations we take the allocation of resources of female dictators to male re-
cipients as the benchmark. For the remaining dictator–recipient gender combinations, we 
include the dummy variables F–F, M–F, and M–M, where the first (second) term indicates 
the gender of the dictator (recipient).
We also add a variable that counts the number of coins given to the stranger (Give 
stranger). We do so to control for the dictators’ baseline altruism. People who are generally 
more generous to others (i.e., irrespective of their ties with and the characteristics of the 
other) can be expected to have more friends and, hence, may have a higher likelihood of 
having a friendship relation with the recipient. This implies that to get an unbiased estimate 
of the effect of friendship ties, we should control for baseline altruism.
In a second model, we add further control variables that may be correlated with both 
gender and sharing. More specifically, we add controls for the age, education, wealth, resi-
dence in village, and visits to urban center of the dictator and the recipient separately.
In a third model, we add a dummy variable equal to one if the dictator calls the recipient 
a friend, zero otherwise (Friendship tie). By comparing the models with and without this 
variable, we can test whether gender differences in sharing with fellow villagers are due to a 
direct gender effect, and to what extent they are mediated via friendship ties.
Finally, in all models, we control for the decision number in the sequence of the dicta-
tors’ allocation decisions and we add fixed effects for the five different assistants who visited 
the dictators at their homes, to control for a potential assistant bias. In this way, we also 
control for the gender of the experimenter, which might influence the dictators’ decision in 
the experiment.
Table 5 presents the results of the different models. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient of 
the gender combination F–F shows that women give on average between 1.107 and 1.420 
coins more to women than to men. The coefficients of M–F and M–M show that men give 
on average between 1.815 and 2.038 coins more to women and between 2.141 and 2.475 
coins more to men than women give to men. Note that the size of the gender effects is larger 
in Model 2, where we add controls for socioeconomic characteristics of the dictator and 
17. For this we used the Stata code provided by Petersen (2009).
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76 Journal of Development Perspectives
recipient. The results also confirm that men do not differentiate between male and female 
recipients. The coefficients of M–F and M–M are not significantly different from each other 
(in both models p > 0.371, two-sided F-tests), indicating that men are equally generous to 
male and female recipients. This is in contrast to women, who are more generous to women 
than to men, as indicated by the statistically significant coefficient of F–F. Furthermore, 
while men are more generous to men than women are to men, men and women are equally 
generous to women. This is confirmed by comparing coefficients of the M–F and F–F vari-
ables (in both models p > 0.447, two-sided F-tests).
In Model 3, where we control for the existence of a friendship relation between the dic-
tator and recipient, we observe that the effect of a friendship relation on resource sharing 
with other villagers is statistically significant at the 5% level. On average, dictators give 
nearly 2 coins more to friends compared to nonfriends. This positive and sizeable effect 
of friendship ties is consistent with studies examining generosity in friendship networks 
among students and pupils (Branãs-Garza et al. 2010; Goeree et al. 2010; Leider et al. 2009). 
Importantly, the observation that the size of the coefficients of the gender combinations 
remains large and statistically significant with controls for social ties, indicates that there 
is a direct gender effect on resource sharing, which does not work through the influence of 
gender on friendship tie formation.18
18. In the village almost all villagers know each other: in 93.5% of all possible ties the other was known. 
For those dyads where the other was not known, socioeconomic differences cannot have influenced 
resource sharing (although gender differences might still have an effect because dictators could 
infer the gender of the recipient from their name). To test whether this might affect the results, we 
also estimate the models using only those dyads where the dictator indicated a known recipient. 
The results are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C and are very similar to those discussed here.
Table 5 Determinants of Sharing with Village Recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F–F 1.107* 1.420** 1.392** 1.407**
M–F (0.610)
1.815**
(0.618)
2.038**
(0.608)
2.022**
(0.599)
2.017**
M–M (0.817)
2.141**
(0.840)
2.475***
(0.839)
2.125**
(0.840)
2.144**
Give stranger (0.858)
0.477***
(0.927)
0.471***
(0.896)
0.478***
(0.941)
0.474***
Friendship tie (0.081) (0.075) (0.074)
1.908**
(0.074)
1.284*
(0.739) (0.710)
Constant 4.485*** 2.579 2.336 2.409
(1.357) (2.561) (2.509) (2.546)
R2 0.422 0.468 0.484 0.479
Observations 282 270 270 270
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tie - - non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used.
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We further investigate gender differences by running Models 1 and 2 separately for fe-
male and male dictators. The results, reported in Table 6, show that for male dictators, the 
coefficient of the friendship tie variable is stronger than with the pooled model and highly 
significant. Specifically, male dictators give on average almost 2.5 coins more to friends. 
In stark contrast, for female dictators, friendship ties have no effect on resource sharing. 
Female dictators are equally generous to friends and nonfriends. This indicates that the 
previously observed positive effect of friendship ties in the pooled model was driven by 
male dictators in the sample. The results also confirm again that women are less generous 
toward men.
3.4 Robustness Tests: Gender Biases in the Reporting of Friendship Ties
In the analysis of the influence of friendship ties on sharing, so far we ignored potential gen-
der differences in the reporting of these ties. Women and men might differ in the reporting 
of friendship ties if, for example, they use different definitions of friendship. In addition, it 
is very common for two persons in a dyad not to coincide in the reporting of a friendship tie 
between them (see, e.g., Comola and Fafchamps (2014)), and men and women may differ in 
such discordant reporting. Both issues might bias the estimated effect of friendship ties, and 
thus also the direct gender effects on sharing.
We first look at the reporting of mixed-gender ties, for which we go back to Table 3. 
Comparing the reporting of mixed ties by men and women, we observe that men report 
them equally likely as women do (6.34% and 9.92%, respectively, and two-sided p = 0.160 
of a Wald test, adjusted for multiple observations per individual). This suggests that there is 
no gender bias in the reporting of mixed-gender friendship ties.
Table 6 Determinants of Sharing by Gender of the Dictator
(a) Men (b) Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male recipient 0.186 20.278 20.143 21.574*** 21.574*** 21.549***
(0.542) (0.544) (0.510) (0.592) (0.593) (0.568)
Give stranger 0.534*** 0.557*** 0.534*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.459***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097)
Friendship tie 2.447*** 1.198* -0.006 1.262
(0.884) (0.630) (1.217) (1.304)
Constant 6.671 6.282 6.919 5.836 5.837 5.317
(4.287) (4.094) (4.188) (4.088) (4.071) (4.265)
R2 0.539 0.571 0.550 0.492 0.492 0.499
Observations 130 130 130 140 140 140
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tie – non-sym. OR-tie – non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used.
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Second, the same table also has a panel (b) which reports the same frequencies but 
conditional on alter (i.e., the other person in a dyad) having reported a friendship tie. 
This allows us to study the extent to which two persons agree on having a friendship 
tie. We observe that it is very common for one person not to report a tie when the other 
does. Looking at same-gender dyads, we find that concordant reporting is more common 
among men than among women. In 28.38% of the male–male dyads in which at least one 
person reports a friendship tie, both persons report such a tie, while with female–female 
dyads, this frequency is only 17.54%. Based on an adjusted Wald test, this difference is 
statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.021). Looking at mixed-gender dyads, we observe 
that men tend to agree somewhat less on the ties reported by women than women agree 
on the ties reported by men, but that this difference is not statistically significant (11.39% 
versus 17.09%; two-sided p = 0.269 of an adjusted Wald test). In sum, while we find no 
gender differences in the reporting of mixed-gender ties, we do find gender differenc-
es in discordant reporting, which is less frequent among men than among women and 
mixed-gender dyads.
To deal with discordant reporting, a common procedure is to symmetrize the social 
ties. More specifically, we will use OR-ties, in which we assume there is a friendship tie 
when at least one of both nodes in a dyad reports such a tie.19 Table 7 reports the frequen-
cies of OR-ties by gender combination. We observe that friendship ties are more common 
among male-only dyads than among female-only dyads or mixed-gender dyads. Based on 
an adjusted Wald test, this difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000 for 
each comparison). The frequency of friendship ties is not statistically different between 
mixed-gender dyads and female-only dyads (two-sided p = 0.644 of an adjusted Wald 
test). This picture is similar to the nonsymmetrized ties, but ties are obviously more fre-
quent with OR-ties.
To test whether the results reported in Section 3.3 are robust to using OR-ties, we run the 
same regressions with OR-ties instead of ties as reported by the dictator. Model 4 in Table 5 
presents the regression results for the pooled sample. We observe that the effect of friend-
ship ties remains (marginally) significant. Importantly, the gender effects are robust to the 
use of OR-ties. In Models 3 and 6 in Table 6, which reports the results disaggregated by the 
gender of the dictator, we observe that the effect of a friendship tie between the dictator and 
the recipient is now comparable for men and women. Finally, the negative coefficient of 
“Male recipient” remains robust in terms of effect size and statistical significance.
19. In doing so we follow the practices of earlier network studies (cf.,  Jackson et al. 2012; Leider et al. 
2009).
Table 7 Summary Statistics of Friendship Ties (OR-ties)
Freq. N
Male-only dyads 31.72% 1,693
Female-only dyads 12.51% 1,870
Mixed-gender dyads 12.95% 3,613
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
Gender inequality in access to resources and opportunities remains persistent in many 
domains. In rural areas in developing countries where gender inequality tends to be 
more severe, access to resources is mostly determined by resource sharing by fellow vil-
lagers. To better understand the mechanisms behind gender inequality, it is therefore 
important to study how gender influences such resource sharing. In addition, as resource 
sharing in rural villages tends to be strongly embedded in social networks, it is important 
to take into account the social ties of men and women in such an analysis. To do so, we 
elicited for a rural village in Nicaragua the friendship ties among the spouses of almost 
all households and implemented a series of dictator games played with fellow villagers 
as well as strangers.
We found that women tend to share less than men, and that this difference is largest 
when dictator and recipient live in the same village and have different genders. We also 
observed that friendship ties exert a positive influence on sharing and that women have 
fewer friendship ties within their village than men. In addition, we found that there 
remains a strong direct gender effect on within-village sharing, after controlling for dif-
ferences in friendship ties, with women sharing less than men and less with men than 
with women.
These results suggest several mechanisms that are responsible for the observed gender 
differences in sharing, most of which we link to the gendered division of labor in rural 
societies. First, women’s reponsibilities to take care of health- and food-related household 
consumption (including for their children) could explain why they share less than men 
with community members outside their household. In a similar vein, if women expect men 
to spend resources on nonhousehold-related consumption, they may be more reluctant to 
share with men than with women.20
Moreover, the gendered division of labor leads to more severe time and mobility 
constraints for women, compared to men (Blackden and Wodon 2006; Hanson 2010; 
Mandel 2006). Men tend to assume tasks that involve greater frequency of social in-
teractions while women assume tasks that require little mobility, such as caring for the 
offspring and the management of the household chores. This could explain the small-
er friendship networks of women compared to men. We indeed found that friendship 
ties among women are less common than friendship ties among men, and are equally 
common as mixed-gender ties. These differences in friendship ties might then influence 
the expected sharing of men and women, as friendship ties exert a positive effect on 
the willingness to share resources, as supported by our results. The time and mobility 
constraints that women face, as well as their responsibility to take care of household 
consumption, could also decrease the instrumental value of sharing with friends. This 
would explain why we found a weaker effect of friendship ties on sharing by women, 
20. This might be strenghtened if men spend resources on alcohol or other nonproductive use, 
which—supported by anecdotal evidence—is very common in Nicaraguan rural villages.
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although we do not want to read too much in this result, because of the relatively small 
number of women with friends in our sample.21
In closing, we discuss some implications for the design of policies or programs that aim 
to increase women’s access to resources. First, the positive effect of friendship ties on re-
source sharing suggests that actions that stimulate the formation of women’s friendship 
ties with men and women could increase the expected amount of resources women receive 
from others in their village. Second, for policies or programs that inject new resources into 
rural villages via local committees or representatives (e.g., via so-called “community-based 
development” (CBD) schemes (Mansuri and Rao 2004), our results indicate that the gender 
and the networks of these entry-points could have a strong influence on the actual resource 
distribution among men and women. If men are used as entry points, friendship networks 
have a strong influence on the distribution, and women who tend to be less connected will 
receive a smaller share. If women distribute resources, in contrast, friendship ties would 
be less important, and women’s tendency to share less with men means that a substantially 
larger share will be distributed among women.
Appendix
A Experimental Instructions
The experimental instructions are originally in Spanish; text between [ ] are instructions for 
the experimenter assistant.
We now ask you to participate in an experiment in which you can earn money. The 
amount of money you earn is yours, whatever the amount is.
Soon I will give you 20 coins of 1 Córdoba and you will be free to divide this amount 
between yourself and another person. For this, we use this small black box [show the box]. 
In this box, you will find 20 coins of 1 Córdoba [open the box and show the 20 coins]. You 
are allowed to take as many coins as you wish. The coins you leave in the box will be given 
to another person. In particular, we ask you to do the following:
1. Take the number of coins you want to keep out of the box and leave in the box the 
coins you want to give to the other person.
2. Refill the box with these small rings [show metal rings] and put the lid on the box. 
In this way, I will not be able to see how many coins you will have left in the box, 
21. It should be noted that we cannot exclude the possibility that dictators revealed themselves to 
the recipients after our experiment and that this may have influenced their sharing decisions. As-
suming that they would only approach recipients if they were generous and if they expected their 
claims about their sharing to be perceived as credible by the recipients, this might have strength-
ened the effect of friendship ties on sharing, through a mechanism of “anticipated reciprocity.” 
More specifically, one would be more generous to people who would reciprocate the generosity. 
We expect this to be particularly relevant for the sharing among men who, thanks to their lower 
time and mobility constraints, are more able to approach fellow villagers after the experiment to 
enforce such reciprocity.
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nor can I get an idea about it through the weight of the box. The weight of the box 
will always be the same whatever the amount of coins you leave in the box.
Thereafter, we put a sticker on the box with the name of the person who will get the 
coins and we put some tape on it to seal the box. I will give the box to my supervisor, 
who waits at the car and who will bring the coins to the other person. Note that you will 
know the identity of the other person, whereas that other person will NOT know your 
identity.
I will now give you some arbitrary examples for further clarification. [Take the coins of 
one of the boxes and use them for the examples].
1. You have here 20 coins of 1 Córdoba. Imagine that you decide to take 2 coins out of 
the box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 2 equals 18)
2. I will give you another example. Imagine that you decide to take 10 coins out of the 
box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 10 equals 10)
3. I will give you a final example. Imagine that you decide to take 20 coins out of the 
box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 20 equals 0).
We will repeat this experiment six times. Each time, you will be able to take coins and 
leave coins for the other person, who will each time be a different one. Thus, I will give you 
six boxes of 20 coins to divide between yourself and another person. Each time, this person 
will be a different one. The first time you will divide the 20 coins with someone from anoth-
er village in this region. You will not know this person. The other five times you will divide 
20 coins with someone from your community. Once again, note that this other person will 
NOT know your identity.
To select the five persons of your community, I will ask you to take small cards from 
this bag. Each card has a different number, and each number corresponds to a different 
person in the community. After having taken a number, I will look up this number on 
a list and tell you the name of that person. Thereafter, I will give you a box with coins, 
so that you can decide on the number of coins you keep and how many you give to the 
other person. When taking this decision, I will give you privacy. You can go inside your 
house, [if this is not possible, say: I will turn my back so that I will be unable to know 
your decision; give me a signal when you are ready]. Please do not tell me the decision 
you will make or you have taken.
After having taken your decision and having closed the box we will seal the box, and you 
are not allowed any more to change your decision. Thereafter, we will draw another number 
from the bag and I will ask you to take the next decision. [Ask whether the participant has 
any questions, and clarify any doubts if needed. If there are no further questions, start with 
the first decision.]
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B Full Models
Table B.1 Determinants of Sharing with Village Recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F–F 1.107* 1.420** 1.392** 1.407**
M–F (0.610)
1.815**
(0.618)
2.038**
(0.608)
2.022**
(0.599)
2.017**
M–M (0.817)
2.141**
(0.840)
2.475***
(0.839)
2.125**
(0.840)
2.144**
Give stranger (0.858)
0.477***
(0.927)
0.471***
(0.896)
0.478***
(0.941)
0.474***
(0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Round 2 20.566 20.542 20.613 20.600
(0.575) (0.545) (0.553) (0.524)
Round 3 20.618 20.604 20.734 20.550
(0.584) (0.594) (0.624) (0.598)
Round 4 20.607 20.455 20.526 20.436
(0.485) (0.471) (0.488) (0.467)
Round 5 20.864 20.745 20.843 20.694
(0.561) (0.607) (0.600) (0.611)
Age (dict.) 0.033 0.036 0.032
(0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
Age (rec.) 0.027 0.030 0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Education (dict.) 0.026 0.004 0.013
(0.131) (0.122) (0.126)
Education (rec.) 20.019 20.023 20.025
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Years village (dict.) 20.012 20.016 20.015
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Years village (rec.) 20.012 20.014 20.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Urban (dict.) 0.054 0.026 0.044
(0.149) (0.140) (0.142)
Urban (rec.) 20.080* 20.082* 20.077
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048)
Wealth (dict.) 0.235 0.206 0.206
(0.152) (0.136) (0.147)
Wealth (rec.) 20.085 20.120 20.124
Friendship tie (0.076) (0.078)
1.908**
(0.085)
1.284*
(0.739) (0.710)
Constant 4.485*** 2.579 2.336 2.409
(1.357) (2.561) (2.509) (2.546)
R2 0.422 0.468 0.484 0.479
Observations 282 270 270 270
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tie 2 2 non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used.
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Table B.2 Determinants of Resource Sharing by Gender
(a) Men (b) Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male recipient 0.186 20.278 20.143 21.574*** 21.574*** 21.549***
(0.542) (0.544) (0.510) (0.592) (0.593) (0.568)
Give stranger 0.534*** 0.557*** 0.534*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.459***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097)
Age (dict.) 20.003 0.005 20.006 0.022 0.022 0.023
(0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059)
Age (rec.) 0.037 0.040* 0.040 0.006 0.006 0.012
(0.028) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Education (dict.) 0.127 0.099 0.127 0.042 0.042 0.011
(0.208) (0.188) (0.202) (0.133) (0.133) (0.124)
Education (rec.) 0.025 0.006 0.006 20.103 20.103 20.080
(0.086) (0.082) (0.087) (0.097) (0.097) (0.101)
Years village (dict.) 0.026 0.019 0.025 20.030 20.030 20.040
(0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.051) (0.050) (0.048)
Years village (rec.) 0.012 0.014 0.014 20.015 20.015 20.018
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021)
Urban (dict.) 20.079 20.111 20.104 0.030 0.030 0.071
(0.174) (0.160) (0.172) (0.377) (0.381) (0.377)
Urban (rec.) 20.109** 20.104*** 20.101** 0.045 0.045 0.055
(0.052) (0.032) (0.042) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
Wealth (dict.) 0.523** 0.363 0.508** 0.212 0.212 0.189
(0.249) (0.250) (0.251) (0.189) (0.185) (0.197)
Wealth (rec.) 20.112 20.161* 20.142 20.100 20.100 20.142
(0.114) (0.096) (0.096) (0.072) (0.067) (0.098)
Round 2 20.948 21.091 21.037 20.189 20.189 20.219
(0.819) (0.882) (0.872) (0.736) (0.731) (0.714)
Round 3 20.543 20.921 20.591 20.574 20.574 20.390
(0.865) (1.005) (0.890) (0.887) (0.889) (0.931)
Round 4 20.200 20.410 20.316 20.745 20.745 20.553
(0.620) (0.699) (0.660) (0.715) (0.720) (0.792)
Round 5 20.658 21.065 20.677 20.764 20.765 20.629
(0.941) (0.879) (0.941) (0.741) (0.766) (0.831)
Friendship tie 2.447*** 1.198* 20.006 1.262
(0.884) (0.630) (1.217) (1.304)
Constant 6.671 6.282 6.919 5.836 5.837 5.317
(4.287) (4.094) (4.188) (4.088) (4.071) (4.265)
R2 0.539 0.571 0.550 0.492 0.492 0.499
Observations 130 130 130 140 140 140
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tie 2 non-sym. OR-tie 2 non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used.
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D Additional Analyses with OR-ties
C Analysis with Known Dyads Only
Table C.1 Determinants of Sharing with Village Recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F–F 1.252* 1.599** 1.562** 1.582**
M–F (0.650)
2.099**
(0.631)
2.388***
(0.627)
2.364***
(0.615)
2.367***
M–M (0.845)
2.358***
(0.883)
2.771***
(0.879)
2.428***
(0.880)
2.451**
Give stranger (0.890)
0.459***
(0.944)
0.450***
(0.929)
0.457***
(0.966)
0.453***
Friendship tie (0.081) (0.073) (0.072)
1.797**
(0.072)
1.232*
(0.780) (0.737)
Constant 4.655*** 3.189 2.938 2.992
(1.283) (2.601) (2.533) (2.582)
R2 0.417 0.468 0.483 0.479
Observations 275 263 263 263
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tie 2 2 non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used. Only pairs used in which the dictator knows the recipient.
Figure D.1 Sharing by social proximity (OR-ties)
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